Less than 24 hours separated Morocco and Israel’s decision to upgrade their diplomatic relations to embassy level from Washington’s move to open the way for one of the Middle East’s most sensitive arms deals.
Officially, the two developments are unrelated. But information obtained by Assahifa English from Western sources points to a more complex process behind the scenes, involving Saudi Arabia’s concerns over Iran, Israeli security calculations, Morocco’s role, the Sahara issue and the future of Gaza.
The timing was striking. On September 16, Morocco and Israel announced in New York that they had agreed to upgrade their relations by opening embassies and appointing ambassadors.
The following day, September 17, Washington announced that the US State Department had approved a possible sale to Saudi Arabia of 48 F-35 fighter jets and 49 related engines, in a deal worth up to $24.3 billion and subject to the congressional process.
It may have been a coincidence. But in the Middle East, where major understandings can take shape months before they are publicly announced, the sequence raises a difficult question: what changed for Washington to open the door to a capability that had remained highly sensitive for years, and how did Morocco become part of an equation involving Riyadh, Tel Aviv and Washington?
The Saudi deal is significant. Israel is currently the only Middle Eastern country operating F-35 stealth fighters, while US law requires Washington to take Israel’s qualitative military edge into account when considering major arms sales to other countries in the region.
In other words, a possible F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia required more than Riyadh’s ability to pay for the aircraft. It also required a shift in the political and security calculations, involving Washington and Riyadh and, in the background, Israel and Morocco. So what changed?
Saudi Arabia’s obstacles to obtaining F-35s
Saudi Arabia requested F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets from US President Donald Trump in early 2025, according to Reuters. Since then, the regional security environment has changed significantly, with the war involving Iran, growing attacks linked to the conflict, and strikes on critical energy infrastructure and transport routes placing Saudi security under direct pressure.
In September alone, Saudi energy facilities and routes were hit by disruptions and attacks. Riyadh also sought direct US military support and, in some cases, received intelligence assistance instead.
According to several sources who spoke to Assahifa English, this changed how Saudi officials approached the issue.
The question was no longer simply how to modernize the Saudi air force or acquire the most advanced aircraft available from the US defense industry. The discussion, according to the sources, became more fundamental: how can Saudi Arabia build a stronger independent deterrent if the alliances on which it has spent billions do not necessarily guarantee direct intervention when a threat reaches its territory?
The F-35 therefore returned to the center of the discussion with greater urgency, even though the issue had remained part of the sensitive talks between Riyadh and Washington, as well as congressional and industry lobbying surrounding the Saudi relationship.
Israel’s objections to Saudi Arabia’s F-35 bid
As Riyadh continued to push for the F-35, the longstanding obstacle remained. Israel had reservations about the deal, while Washington had to weigh the need to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge against pressure from groups opposed to Saudi Arabia receiving a military capability of this scale.
Sources told Assahifa English that, during its broader negotiations with Riyadh, Washington saw a political understanding with Israel as a way to make any change in Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities less politically costly, both inside Israel and in Washington.
Riyadh, however, faced another problem. Publicly normalizing relations with Israel under the current regional circumstances was not a decision that could simply be announced at a press conference. Its political cost in Saudi Arabia and across the Arab and Muslim worlds would be considerable, particularly amid the continuing Palestinian issue and the fallout from the Gaza war.
The discussions with Washington also extended beyond Israel, according to the sources cited in this report. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China became part of the wider debate over the kingdom’s position between Washington and Beijing, particularly in the financial, technological and strategic fields.
Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia’s central bank ended its participation in the mBridge project, which had been led by China’s central bank. The cross-border payments initiative used central bank digital currencies and was designed, among other objectives, to reduce reliance on the US dollar over the medium and long term.
Saudi Arabia joined the project as an observer in 2023 and became a full participant in 2024. It later took part in developing and testing the platform before completing its proof-of-concept phase on May 13, 2025. According to the sources, Riyadh subsequently decided not to join the next stages amid US pressure as negotiations over the F-35 began.
Sources who spoke to Assahifa English place that decision within a broader US effort to reduce some of Saudi Arabia’s strategic links with China, particularly in areas Washington considers sensitive from a security and technology standpoint. The mBridge issue was one of the indicators followed in that process.
At the same time, Riyadh began adjusting some aspects of its economic and strategic cooperation with Beijing and gradually preparing the ground for movement on its relationship with Israel, the sources said. That did not necessarily mean Saudi Arabia was ready for full public normalization with Israel.
Morocco enters the equation
According to Western sources who spoke to Assahifa English, channels were opened between Riyadh and Rabat to explore a formula that could move some of the outstanding issues forward without requiring Saudi Arabia to immediately announce normalization with Israel.
This came after a period of strained relations between the two countries’ leaderships, according to the sources.
The idea, according to the same sources, was not for Morocco simply to carry a Saudi message to Israel. Rather, the discussions involved a broader package of interconnected interests in which each party had something it wanted and something it could offer. The most sensitive part of this account concerns Israel’s position on the F-35.
According to Assahifa English sources, after progress between Riyadh and Washington on other issues, securing Israel’s approval for a formula that would not, from Israel’s perspective, undermine its qualitative military edge became one of the main remaining obstacles.
The sources say Rabat then worked to persuade Tel Aviv to soften its position toward Washington over the Saudi deal, as part of a broader understanding in which the interests of the three sides converged.
For Morocco and Israel, one of the key elements was upgrading relations from liaison offices to full embassies and exchanging ambassadors.
That upgrade was announced in New York on September 16, during a meeting between Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and his Israeli counterpart Gideon Sa’ar, in the presence of US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz.
For Israel, the move was not simply a change in diplomatic protocol, according to the sources who spoke to Assahifa English.
The sources say Israel attaches particular importance to three Arab and Muslim countries because of their religious and political weight: Egypt, home to Al-Azhar; Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s two holiest sites and whose king is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques; and Morocco, where the king holds the title of Commander of the Faithful and religious legitimacy is a central element of the monarchy.
From this perspective, upgrading relations with Morocco carries significance beyond the exchange of ambassadors. It gives Israel a relationship with a country where the monarchy’s religious role is deeply embedded in the political system.
Israel, for its part, officially defines itself as a Jewish state. According to the sources, this adds to the importance it attaches to relations with countries whose religious institutions carry influence beyond their borders. The result was a package in which each side had a different objective.
Saudi Arabia wanted to remove political and security obstacles to an arms deal it viewed as part of building a new deterrent capability. Israel wanted security guarantees and a deeper diplomatic presence in the region. Morocco wanted to take its relationship with Israel and Washington to a new level while advancing issues it considers strategic.
For Rabat, those issues included defense cooperation with Israel, military manufacturing and the transfer of defense-related technologies, as well as the issue at the center of its foreign policy: The Sahara file.
The diplomatic stakes surrounding the UN Security Council’s upcoming October session were also part of the discussions, according to the sources. Rabat placed these issues on the table as it sought to upgrade its relationship with Tel Aviv to ambassadorial and embassy level, a move announced on September 16 with US backing. Gaza was another part of the broader picture.
According to information previously obtained by Assahifa English, Morocco’s involvement in security arrangements for the Gaza Strip could include officers and members of the gendarmerie and police, as well as a field military hospital.
But the most sensitive element of the sources’ account concerns the weapons themselves.
According to the sources, discussions went beyond Saudi Arabia’s F-35 request and included a future scenario in which Morocco could also acquire a squadron of the aircraft, with Saudi Arabia participating in the financing.
There is currently no public US document confirming this part of the account, and Congress has not been publicly notified of an F-35 sale to Morocco.
If eventually confirmed, however, it would suggest that the developments go beyond the sale of aircraft to Saudi Arabia and extend to a broader reshaping of air power and alliance structures across both the eastern and western Arab world.
The Sahara issue
Sources told Assahifa English that the discussions included diplomatic efforts with Washington aimed specifically at making the next UN resolution on the Sahara issue another step toward advancing the autonomy process and narrowing the remaining legal and political ambiguity surrounding the issue.
The discussions also covered delayed arms deals, as well as plans for military cooperation and the establishment of manufacturing and training facilities in Morocco.
On the Israeli side, the sources describe support for Morocco’s defense industry and the supply of weapons needed by the kingdom, particularly certain interceptor missile systems and cyberwarfare technologies.
They also refer to understandings concerning Morocco’s position on the Palestinian issue and the creation of channels to support Morocco’s efforts to assist Palestinians, with a high priority when needed.
For Washington, Morocco also has strategic value beyond the immediate Middle East, given its position at the western gateway to the Mediterranean, its proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar and its longstanding military and security relationship with the United States.
Taken together, these factors gave Rabat, according to the sources, room to operate where US, Saudi and Israeli interests intersected, rather than simply receiving the outcome of agreements reached by the three capitals.
Beyond the facts: The story whose official chapters have yet to be written
The information gathered by Assahifa English suggests that Rabat was more than a secondary beneficiary of the reshaping of relations with Israel.
According to the sources, Morocco assumed a more complex role, with channels to Riyadh, growing security ties with Tel Aviv and a strategic relationship with Washington.
The question, therefore, is not simply why the second Trump administration opened the way for a possible Saudi F-35 sale. It is also what understandings preceded the decision and what each side received in return for moving the most difficult piece of the equation.
On September 17, the United States announced its approval of a possible $24.3 billion deal involving 48 F-35 aircraft and 49 engines. The approval does not mean the sale has been completed, as the deal remains subject to the US congressional process.
Less than 24 hours earlier, Bourita, Sa’ar and Waltz had met in New York to announce the transition of Moroccan-Israeli relations from liaison offices to embassies, the exchange of ambassadors, the resumption of direct flights and expanded economic cooperation.
That timing gives the New York announcement a different significance in the account provided by the sources.
What appeared publicly as a US-backed diplomatic agreement between Morocco and Israel is described by the sources as the latest visible stage of negotiations that had continued for months, bringing together arms, China, normalization, Sahara, Gaza, military cooperation and diplomatic relations.
The three capitals were not necessarily pursuing the same objective.
Saudi Arabia was seeking a strategic and military gain that could strengthen its deterrence capabilities. Israel was seeking security guarantees while deepening relations with an Arab monarchy with significant religious and political weight.
Morocco was seeking to strengthen its position within a broader regional equation and advance issues it considers central to its security and national interests. Washington, meanwhile, was seeking to bring these different tracks together within a broader framework for its regional alliances.
For now, the publicly documented developments are clear. Washington has opened the way for a possible Saudi F-35 deal, while Morocco and Israel have agreed to open embassies and exchange ambassadors.
The link between the two developments, the role played by Rabat in persuading Israel to soften its position on the Saudi F-35 deal, and the other elements of the package described by the sources remain outside the publicly available official documents.
That is precisely why the less-than-24-hour gap between the two announcements stands out.
The documents signed in New York and the approval announced in Washington the following day may ultimately prove to be two public elements of a broader understanding whose groundwork was laid months earlier away from the spotlight, bringing together Saudi, Moroccan, Israeli and American interests before some of its consequences emerged publicly just one day apart.
